Mereological Indigestion: Why We Cannot Divvy Up the Blob
A metaphysical critique of treating human-made partitions as if they were automatically deep divisions in reality.
Source Paper
This page is a simplified guide to the paper. The source document is linked below; the guide here keeps the main idea accessible and tied back to the site’s model.
Open on Academia.eduLow-Register Abstract
This paper argues that humans divide the world into parts for practical reasons, but those divisions can be mistaken for deep metaphysical joints. We name pieces of reality, then forget that the names often serve our purposes.
The point is not that distinctions are useless. The point is that distinctions should be held with the right confidence and tested for predictive work.
How It Fits Credencing
This paper extends the credencing project into ontology. It asks whether our categories are tracking evidence or merely carrying inherited grammar and convenience.
It pairs naturally with the Threshold and Ontic Snap papers: all three ask how patterns become things in our reasoning.
How to Read It
Read this when a debate depends on where one object, cause, or category ends and another begins. Ask whether the boundary is discovered, useful, negotiated, or merely assumed.