The Two-Gap Theory of Irrationality: Evidence Perception, Belief Integrity, and Diagnostic Repair
The central two-gap paper distinguishing failures of evidence perception from failures of assigned confidence.
Source Paper
This page is a simplified guide to the paper. The source document is linked below; the guide here keeps the main idea accessible and tied back to the site’s model.
Open on Academia.eduLow-Register Abstract
This paper gives the Credencing project its most important diagnostic split. A person can go wrong because they do not see the evidence clearly, or because they see the evidence clearly enough but assign a confidence level that no longer follows what they see.
The first gap runs from Objective Evidence (E0) to Perceived Evidence (EP). The second runs from Perceived Evidence (EP) to Assigned Credence (CA). Once those gaps are separated, repair becomes more precise: improve access and skill for the first gap; improve belief integrity and updateability for the second.
How It Fits Credencing
This paper is the new spine for the public model. It explains why the site separates Calculation Error (DE) from Core Irrationality (IC), and why the interactive archetypes should not be read as one generic scale from rational to irrational.
It also gives the Library a cleaner research map. The later papers on uncertainty, rationalization, institutions, and AI all extend the same two-gap architecture rather than starting separate projects.
How to Read It
Read this after the formal framework if you want the diagnostic version of the model. Keep asking where the breakdown occurs: evidence access, evidence processing, confidence assignment, or update resistance.
Adjacent References
These are starting points rather than exhaustive citations. They connect this page to nearby work in probability, calibration, cognitive bias, and social epistemology.
- |Thomas Bayes, "An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances" (1763).
- |E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science (2003).