References
References collect sources, influences, and adjacent traditions in epistemology, probability, psychology, and institutional reasoning.
Probability and Updating
Thomas Bayes, "An Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances" (1763), remains the historical starting point for Bayesian updating. E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science (2003), is a major modern expression of probability as extended logic. These sources sit behind the site treatment of priors, likelihoods, posteriors, and Bayesian movement.
Heuristics, Biases, and Calibration
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases" (1974), anchors much of the modern discussion of bias and base-rate neglect. Sarah Lichtenstein, Baruch Fischhoff, and Lawrence D. Phillips, "Calibration of Probabilities" (1982), is a natural reference point for the site emphasis on confidence matching reliability.
Motivated and Social Reasoning
Ziva Kunda, "The Case for Motivated Reasoning" (1990), and Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge, "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs" (2006), help frame cases where reasoning is directionally pressured. Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment (2005), and Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge (1990), connect the project to expert judgment and social epistemology.
How References Should Function
References are not decoration. They help readers test the framework, compare it with existing work, and locate places where the project needs refinement. Adjacent-reference panels now appear on many pages where a concept has obvious scholarly neighbors.