Epistemic Akrasia
Epistemic akrasia is believing against one’s own perceived evidence.
Weakness of Epistemic Will
Akrasia is acting against one better judgment. Epistemic akrasia is the belief-forming analogue: assigning a credence that conflicts with what one takes the evidence to warrant.
Everyday Forms
A person may know a fear is exaggerated but treat it as likely. They may know a source is unreliable but believe it because it flatters their group. They may see that an objection is strong but keep repeating the weaker argument.
Relation to Core Irrationality (IC)
Epistemic akrasia is one way Core Irrationality appears from the inside. Core Irrationality (IC) is the measurable gap; akrasia is the lived experience of not following one’s own evidential sense.
What Akrasia Feels Like From the Inside
Epistemic akrasia often feels like a split: one part of the mind sees the evidence, while another part refuses the cost of accepting it. The person may say the right caveats in private and still defend the inflated claim in public.
This is why the model treats akrasia as a repair problem, not merely a label. The agent may need to lower identity threat, make revision socially survivable, or practice saying, "My confidence should be lower than I want it to be."